Legal Review

Interpreting Chapter XIII on Marine Insurance Contracts in the New Maritime Law: A Legal-Aesthetic Study

On May 1, 2026, the revised Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "New Law") officially came into effect. Its Chapter 13, "Marine Insurance Contracts" (Articles 240–282, out of 43), replaced the original Chapter 12 (Articles 216–256, out of 41), marking the first systematic revision since its promulgation in 1993.

The English text below is a convenience translation. The complete original Chinese text follows it.

1. Introduction: Why are 'exegesis' and 'dragon carving' used as instruments?

On May 1, 2026, the revised Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "New Law") officially came into effect. Its Chapter 13, "Marine Insurance Contracts" (Articles 240–282, out of 43), replaced the original Chapter 12 (Articles 216–256, out of 41), marking the first systematic revision since its promulgation in 1993.

This paper attempts to take traditional Chinese philology and the stylistic logic of Liu Xie's "Wenxin Diaolong" as the axis, while also integrating Western theoretical resources from legal linguistics and legal aesthetics (Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law, 1963; Tiersma, Legal Language, 1999; Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 1932; Shu Guoying, "Law from an Aesthetic Perspective—Essays on Legal Aesthetics," 2000), and with reference to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress "Legislative Technical Specifications (Trial) (I)" (2009), the book compares text, syntax, terminology, and normative density in four dimensions, thereby depicting the "literary spirit" trajectory of this revision in both form and thought.

Hermetic theory emphasizes that "form, sound, and meaning seek each other" (Wang Li's words), and the same applies to legislative language. Every change in words reflects adjustments in the normative connotations and the transfer of institutional semantics. As for 'carving dragons,' it is not about ornate language, but about the carving of order. "Structure follows order" and "words do not lose order" represent the highest realm of legislative expression: precise organization and inherent aesthetic tension in tone.

2. Exegesis: Micro-level verification at the level of words and words

(1) Systematic Implantation of the Prefix 'Sea'—The Transformation of 'Form'

After the old law Article 216 defined "insured event," the entire text referred to it as "insured event." The new law reclassified about fifty instances as "marine insurance incidents." This change is not a simple synonymous replacement but an embedding of a distinctive feature marker. As Tiersma (1999) stated, legal terms aim to "create a closed semantic universe that excludes everyday ambiguity." The word "sea" is precisely the boundary marker of this semantic universe, allowing this chapter to maintain institutional independence when intersecting with the Insurance Law.

The second draft of Article 245 (Insurance Contracts for Ships Under Construction) briefly removed "at sea," but later reinstated it. According to the legislative statement, the Legislative Affairs Commission indeed has a tug-of-war between terminology precision and flexibility in application—a public "go-back" is also a textual level of institutional negotiation.

(2) 'Influence' replaces 'causal relationship'—the shift of 'righteousness.'

Article 261 (Guarantee Clause) introduces the word "impact": "If a breach of the guarantee clause has no effect on the occurrence of a marine insurance event, the insurer shall still compensate." "This is a transformation from rigid causation toward flexible relevance.

Etymologically, "influence" originally means "echo of shadows," referring to indirect effects—relatively mild semantic intensity. Comparing the UK Insurance Act 2015 Section 11(b) with the phrase "the proportion which a breach bears to the risk of loss," it is clear that Chinese lawmakers use the "impact" rather than direct "causation" or "proportion" standard, deliberate compromise to balance operability and flexibility. Zheng Rui (2017) described it as a hybrid construction of "Anglo-American substantive rules + mainland relief path."

Moreover, the term "influence" lowers the threshold of proof in the sense of evidence law, creating a relatively flexible shift in the burden of proof between the parties. Ding Jianfeng (2016) pointed out: "The moderate vagueness in legislative language is precisely legislative wisdom." ”——too precise becomes rigid, too vague becomes void。

(3) The "Name" and "Reality" of New and Old Terms

The new law adds four new terminology groups: (1) Standard clauses: such as "active reminder" and "passive explanation" (Article 249), borrowed from Article 496 of the Civil Code but changed to a passive expression; (2) Procedural safeguards: Article 275 "deemed not to accept commission" fills gaps in the old law; (3) Completion of requirements: "Same insurance interest" (Article 251) converges the elements of duplicate insurance with those of Article 56 of the Insurance Law; (4) Criterion of Caution: "Diligence and prudence" (Article 270) comes from the field of tort law.

In contrast, the concept of the "policyholder" remains absent. Maritime law continues to use the MIA1906's binary structure (insurer–assured), while the Insurance Law is tripartite (applicant–insured–insurer). In cases where freight forwarders purchase insurance on behalf of others, the obligation party is a mystery (Yan Bing, 2026). Mellinkoff (1963) confirms this: "The vitality of legal terms depends on the institutional ecology into which they are planted." — Detachment from ecology, semantic drift.

(4) The deduction of the negative sentence pattern of 'ci'

The old law frequently used unified, blunt statements such as "no compensation" and "no liability for compensation." The new law divides it into at least six categories: (1) not bearing compensation liability; (2) The right to collect premiums but not to compensate; (3) Clauses do not become part of the contract; (4) "In principle, no burden, but exceptions apply"; (5) Compensation should be made...... Exceptions; (6) The exercise of the right of termination and the consequence of premium refund are the same consequence. This refinement reflects the emphasis of "accuracy first, conciseness second" as emphasized in the "Legislative Technical Specifications (Trial) (I)". It also echoes Perelman's The New Rhetoric (1970)—the persuasiveness of legal arguments stems from the rationality and proportionality of the structure, not the ornate language.

3. Carved Dragon Section: Chapter Structure and Syntactic Aesthetics

(1) Macro Measurement

Indicators

Old Law (1993)

New Law (2026)

Change

Chapter Scope

Chapter 12 / Articles 216–256

Chapter 13 / Articles 240–282

and the order of the items was postponed accordingly

Total number of articles

41

43

+4.9%

Number of sections

and did not change

Main Word Count (approx.)

5200

6200

+19.2%

Original language

Complete original Chinese text

The complete Chinese original migrated from the previous website and checked for completeness follows.

一、引论:为何以「训诂」「雕龙」为器?

2026年5月1日,修订后的《中华人民共和国海商法》(下称“新法”)正式施行。其第十三章“海上保险合同”(第240—282条,共43条)取代了原第十二章(第216—256条,共41条),这是自1993年颁行以来的首次系统性修订。

本文尝试以中国传统训诂学与刘勰《文心雕龙》的文体逻辑为轴线,同时揉合西方法律语言学与法美学的理论资源(Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law, 1963; Tiersma, Legal Language, 1999; Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 1932; 舒国滢,《从美学的观点看法律——法美学散论》,2000),再参照全国人大法工委《立法技术规范(试行)(一)》(2009),以文字、句法、术语与规范密度四维进行比对,从而描绘出本次修订在形式与思想层面的“文心”轨迹。

训诂学强调“形、音、义三者互求”(王力语),立法语言亦然。每一个字词改动皆反映规范内涵的调整、制度语义的迁移。至于“雕龙”,则不在雕饰辞藻,而在条理之雕。“局义随条理”“字不失次”,乃立法表达的最高境界:条理精密,语气自有美学张力。

 

二、训诂篇:字词层面的微观考证

(一)「海上」前缀的系统植入——“形”之变

旧法第216条定义“保险事故”后,通篇简称“保险事故”。新法则约五十余处改为“海上保险事故”。这种改动并非简单同义替换,而是一种 distinctive feature marker 的嵌入。正如 Tiersma (1999) 所言,legal terms aim to “create a closed semantic universe that excludes everyday ambiguity.” “海上”二字正是该语义宇宙的边界标志,使本章在与《保险法》交叉时保持制度独立性。

245条(建造中船舶保险合同)的二审稿曾短暂删去“海上”,后又恢复。据立法说明可见,法工委在术语精确性与适用弹性之间确有博弈——一次公开的“去—回”,也是一场文字层面的制度谈判。

(二)「影响」替代「因果关系」——“义”之迁

261条(保证条款)引入“影响”一词:“若违反保证条款对海上保险事故的发生没有影响的,保险人仍应赔偿。”这是一种从 rigid causation toward flexible relevance 的转型。

从词源看,“影响”原为“影之所响”,指间接效应——语义强度相对温和。比较英国 Insurance Act 2015 11条(b) 之表述 “the proportion which a breach bears to the risk of loss”,可知中国立法者取“影响”而非直接的“因果关系”或“比例”标准,是 deliberate compromise 以兼顾可操作性与弹性。郑睿(2017)称其为“英美实体规则 + 大陆救济路径”的混合构造。

此外,“影响”一词在证据法意义上降低了证明门槛,使举证责任在双方间形成较柔性的摆动。丁建峰(2016)指出:“立法语言的适度模糊恰是立法智慧。”——too precise becomes rigid, too vague becomes void。

(三)新旧术语的“名”与“实”

新法中新增术语可分四组:
(1) 格式条款:如“主动提示、被动说明”(第249条),借自《民法典》第496条但改为被动化表达;
(2) 程序保障:第275条“视为不接受委付”补足旧法空缺;
(3) 要件补全:“同一保险利益”(第251条)使重复保险的构成要件与《保险法》第56条趋同;
(4) 注意标准:“勤勉谨慎”(第270条)来自侵权法领域。

相对地,“投保人”概念依然缺席。海商法继续沿用 MIA1906 的二元架构(insurer–assured),而《保险法》为三元(applicant–insured–insurer)。在货代代投保情形下,告知义务主体成谜(阎冰,2026)。Mellinkoff (1963) 的断言在此印证:“The vitality of legal terms depends on the institutional ecology into which they are planted.”——脱离生态,语义漂移。

(四)否定句式的“辞”之演

旧法频繁出现“不得赔偿”“不负赔偿责任”等笼统一刀切表述。新法将其细分为至少六类:(1)不承担赔偿责任;(2)有权收取保费但不赔偿;(3)条款不成为合同内容;(4)“原则上不承担,但有例外”;(5)应当赔偿但……除外;(6)解除权行使与保费退还并列后果。
这种重新雕琢,体现了《立法技术规范(试行)(一)》所强调的“准确优先、简洁次之”。 也呼应Perelman的The New Rhetoric1970)——法律论证的说服力根源于结构的合理与比例,而非语言的华丽。

 

三、雕龙篇:篇章结构与句法美学

(一)宏观计量

指标

旧法(1993)

新法(2026)

变化

章节范围

12章 / 第216–256条

13章 / 第240–282条

条次顺延

条文总数

41

43

+4.9%

节数

6

6

不变

正文字数(约)

5200

6200

+19.2%

平均每条字数

127

144

+13.4%

“但是”但书

12

22

+83%

分号频次

稀疏

显著增加

结构扩张

法条虽仅增两条,但信息密度提升约五分之一,句法复杂度亦显扩大。

(二) “二段条件式”到“多层决策树”

旧法第235条属典型“trigger–consequence”二段式。新法第261条呈四层嵌套:
(1) 定义义务主体;(2) 按时序划分责任区;(3) 设置例外条件;(4) 分配举证责任。
若以 Yngve–Kalén 深度模型计,嵌套层级由3–4跃升至7–8。 刘勰在《镕裁》中说:“规范本体谓之镕,剪裁浮辞谓之裁。”——此“裁”乃结构性增饰而非删削,美在严密。

(三)但书的修辞逻辑

新法中但书(proviso)可谓成片繁殖,例如:
(a) 第248条“未告知……对事故发生有影响的除外”;
(b) 第249条“被保险人知道或应当知道的除外”;
(c) 第259条“仅在预约合同无不同约定时适用”;
(d) 第261条“两项例外”条款。

Perelman 的修辞理论认为,每一个但书都是“反向论证锚点”(anchoring counter-argument)——当主条文赋权时,随即为反面留出说理出口,防止规则僵化。
英国 Insurance Act 2015  proportionality 原理取代 all-or-nothing,即同理。拉德布鲁赫说:“法最僵化,艺术最灵动。”新法的“但书之美”,正是以灵动制僵。

(四) 主语置换的语法革命

“被保险人应当立即书面通知保险人”变为“保险人应当书面通知被保险人”,表面是语态替换,实质是法律后果逻辑的重构:
(i) 解除权从“自动生效”变为“通知触发”;
(ii) 风险空窗期由被保险人转移至保险人,更平衡。

这可谓立法语言学上的结构逆转。主语选取即价值判断:“谁应更审慎”,蕴于语法选择之中。刘勰《书记》曰:“书记广大,衣被事体。”立法文本的“主语布置”,实乃制度权衡的文辞体现。

(五) 标点的阶梯化系统

新法标点体系大幅升级:
(1) 列项统一使用“(一)(二)(三)”并以分号连接;
(2) 条内层级以句号、分号、逗号层层递进;
(3) 标点成为语义层级的视觉信号——读者可凭分号辨层。

这符合 GB/T 15834—2011《标点符号用法》。人大法工委《重视立法表达 提高立法质量》(2020)亦强调,立法表达若能在语法与修辞上达成平衡,法之“文心”乃现。

 

四、比较法坐标

(一) 与《保险法》的五重区分

维度

《保险法》(2015)

新《海商法》(2026)

立法取向

主体结构

投保人–被保险人–保险人

被保险人–保险人

坚守英式二元

告知对象

投保人

被保险人(第247条)

刻意区分

说明义务

主动说明 (第17条)

被动说明 (第249条)

降格保护

解除权期限

30日+两年抗辩期

30日除斥,无抗辩期

严格确性

保证条款后果

一般违约处理

分层+“影响”标准

制度创新

这种 deliberate differentiation 并非疏忽,而是以专业商事主体为假设的立法策略。朱涛(2017)强调:“判断民事立法语言优劣,关键在准确与否。”新法的“准确”,是一种特别法语境下的逻辑美。

(二) MIA1906–Insurance Act 2015:从直译到扬弃

海商法保险章源自 MIA1906。旧法第235条基本为 s.33(1) 的直译。新法第261条则吸收 Insurance Act 2015 的部分革新——引入因果关联限制与纠正恢复机制,但拒绝按比例赔付制度,保留大陆法式解除路径。这种 transplant with domestication(本地化移植)既维持结构兼容,又强化制度主体性。以《唐律疏议》的语言视角看,可谓“疏议式本化”——吸外来之理,化为己用。

(三) 与中华法系传统的隐秘呼应

唐律以“简、严、精”著称,其中“余条准此”“情”“理”等模糊语式,与现代立法中的“合理时间”“重大利害关系”“应当知道”遥相对应。丁建峰(2016)称:“适度模糊乃立法开放性的体现。”新法第261条“影响”标准、第275条“合理时间”,皆是“情理法”传统在现代语境的延伸。
从美学视角看,这是Weberian rationality“中华圆融”的对称结合:既保留德国式Rechtsdogmatik之严,又承古法“疏而不漏”之智。

 

五、法美学综评:「文心」何在?

(一)精密性飞跃
多层次责任分配矩阵取代“一刀切”否定,规则确定性显著提升。

(二)平衡美学精致化
“但书”爆发、“影响”标准、“被动说明”模式,构成保险人与被保险人之间的柔性平衡——正是 Perelman “audience adaptation” 的修辞逻辑在立法文本中的具化。

(三)可读性的必要让步
261条长达500余字、四层嵌套,可读性下降,但信息浓度提升。Mellinkoff 警示:“The complexity of law must never become a barrier to justice.”其后果有待司法解释与释义读物平衡。

(四)特别法身份的自觉
“海上”前缀、“30日除斥”、被动说明、二元结构,共同勾勒出 maritime lex specialis 的自我边界。舒国滢引拉德布鲁赫言:“法乃僵化之文化构体。”新法的“僵化”乃自觉的制度身份宣告——I borrow from you, but I am not you.

 

六、结语

刘勰《附会》曰:“原始要终,疏条布叶;首尾周密,表里一体。”新海商法保险章的修订,正是一场历时三十余年的 textual microsurgery——增两条、改数十处、易数百字。
从训诂学看,每一次文字变化皆为“形音义互求”;从雕龙观之,每一条结构调整皆是“局义随条理”。它或许不是文学杰作,却展现了成熟立法的理性之美:在承继与创新之间克制,在本土与国际之间清醒,在确定与弹性之间维系那一份 precarious balance。
最终成效如何,仍待司法与实践的共同“后检验”。

 

附录:主要参考文献

[1] 《中华人民共和国海商法》(2025年修订),主席令第58号,2026年5月1日实施。
[2] 《中华人民共和国保险法》(2015年修正);《中华人民共和国民法典》(2020)。
[3] 段玉裁:《说文解字注》,上海古籍出版社,1981年。
[4] 王念孙:《广雅疏证》,中华书局,2004年。
[5] 刘勰著、周振甫注:《文心雕龙注释》,人民文学出版社,1983年。
[6] Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (1932);舒国滢译介《从美学的观点看法律——法美学散论》,《法制与社会发展》2000年第2期。
[7] David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (1963), Little, Brown & Co.
[8] Peter M. Tiersma, Legal Language (1999), University of Chicago Press.
[9] Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (1970), University of Notre Dame Press.
[10] UK Marine Insurance Act 1906;Insurance Act 2015.
[11] 阎冰、刘昌禹:《新〈海商法〉海上保险章修改与相关问题整理》,贸法通,2026年1月。
[12] 董桂芳:《新〈海商法〉海上保险相关修订解读》,京师律师事务所,2025年11月。
[13] 郑睿:《英国海上保险保证制度改革评析》,中国法学网,2017年。
[14] 丁建峰:《立法语言的模糊性问题》,《爱思想》网,2016年8月。
[15] 朱涛:《民法典编纂中的立法语言规范化》,中国法学网,2017年8月。
[16] 沈宗灵:《佩雷尔曼的“新修辞学”法律思想》,《法律科学》2008年第5期。
[17] 全国人大常委会法工委:《立法技术规范(试行)(一)》,2009年。
[18] 全国人大:《重视立法表达 提高立法质量》,中国人大网,2020年11月。
[19] 《唐律立法语言、立法技术及法典体例研究》,法律出版社,2025年。
[20] 何勤华:《中国法律史学》,商务印书馆,2023年。
[21] Britta-Lena Gunnarsson, Legal Discourse as Genre (1993).
[22] 刘蔚铭译,彼得·蒂尔斯马:《彼得论法律语言》,法律出版社,2015年。

This English convenience translation is provided alongside the complete Chinese original, which prevails. Neither version constitutes legal advice on any specific matter.